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1. Introduction 
The concept of the barrier market aims to integrate the forces behind 
the  introduction  of static  and  dynamic economies of market  behav- 
iour.  In general, economists focus  on dynamic economies to the detri- 
ment  of static  economies, or  vice  versa  (see van  Witteloostuijn  and 
Maks,  1987).  The barrier market concept includes static economies of 
market behaviour by adopting a contestable market-like multi-period 
framework.  Baumol  et  al.'s  (1982)  contestable  market  may  be  re- 
garded  as  a  formal  microfoundation  of  the  Chicago  thesis  (e.g. 
Demsetz,  1968),  contending that two firms may be sufficient to guar- 
antee  static  optimal  price  setting  in  a  market  at  a  point  in  time. 
However, a  contestable market  excludes the forces behind the intro- 
duction of dynamic economies of market  behaviour.  It  is  in this  res- 
pect  that  innovations  are  important.  The  barrier  market  allows  for 
the  introduction  of  dynamic  economies  by  means  of  incorporating 
Bain's  (1956)  barriers  to  entry.  In  this  way  forces  behind  the 
introduction of dynamic economies are  incorporated without  damage 
to the static optimal character of market behaviour. 
In  fact,  the  barrier  market  introduces  a  formal  elaboration  of a 
workable  competition  concept  (Clark,  1940).  As  Tisdell  formulates 
the  implications  of  workable  competition:  "The  fear  of entry  might 
keep  prices  down,  substitutes  might  keep  demand  curves  relatively 
fiat  and  entry,, forestalling,  behaviour rmght" spur  the adoption of new 
techniques.  (Tlsdell,  1972, p. 297).  The concept of workable competi- 
tion did not  receive a  formal elaboration,  but  instead just  listings  of 
relevant  criteria (Scherer,  1980, p.  42).  More detailed arguments sup- 
orting  the  proposal  of  the  barrier  market  are  offered  by  Maks 
986),  van  Witteloostuijn  and  Maks  (1987)  and  van  Witteloostuijn 
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The  barrier  market  model is  based  upon  two  theoretical notions: 
threat  of  entry  and  barriers  to  entry.  A  dominant  threat  of entry 
forces incumbent firms in  a  market  to  employ minimum average cost 
pricing,  even  when  entry  barriers  exist.  To  deter  future  entry,  in- 
cumbent firms reduce the ease of entry by means of raising  barriers, 
as  described  in  detail  by  Bain  and  his  successors.  Our  definition  of 
entry  barrier  is  basically  the  same  as  Baumol's  concept,  which 
amounts  to  the presence of sunk  costs.  In  order to  introduce the es- 
sentials  of the  analysis  in  a  lucid  way,  in  this  paper  a  very  simple 
case is  presented.  In section 2  a  model of decision making behaviour 
of an  individual  incumbent or  potential  supplier  in  a  barrier  market 
at  any point  in  time is presented. Then, in section 3,  there is an ana- 
lysis  of the interaction  in  behaviour  between  several  individual  sup- 
pliers  whilst  engaged in  a  competitive process over a  number of peri- 
ods of time. Some final remarks are offered in section 4. 
2.  The Decision Model of the Incumbent and Potential Suppliers 
In  this  section  the  decision  making  behaviour  of an  individual  sup- 
plier  in  a  barrier market  at  a  certain point  in  time is  modeled, given 
his  eapectations  and  knowledge.  In  fact,  the  section  is  devoted  to  a 
very simple model of supply side behaviour of a firm in a  barrier mar- 
ket.  A  firm  is  engaged  in  temporary  and  intertemporal  decision  - 
making, the former focusing on current period price and quantity set- 
ting  and  the  latter  on  raising  barriers  to  entry  in  future  periods. 
Firstly,  the  simple production  structure underlying the  variable  part 
of the  cost  is  described  and,  secondly,  there  is  an  indication of how 
the  investments  lead  to  sunk  costs  and  so  influence  the  production 
technology and the variable cost. 
Following  Baumol  et al.  a  fiat  bottomed  U-shaped  average vari- 
able  cost  curve is  adopted. 1 For  the sake of simplicit.v,  the  course of 
the  supplier's  variable  cost  curve is  determined by  a  Cobb-Douglas 
production function with switching returns: 
a  ~  1  y2  (1)  Yt =  et.  Lt  • Mt,  Y,e,L,MER÷,  0<Yt<  t, 
with, 
(la)  Yt<Yt then a+/~>l, 
(lb)  Y{_<Yt_<Y~  then o~+~=1, and t>Y~ then 0<a+~<l.  (lc)  ' 
Pt' ACt 
Yt  denotes output  produced  and  offered in the  short  or  ultra  short- 
term  period  t  (these  concepts  are  clarified  in  section  3).  Lt  denotes 
units  of  labour,  Mt  units  of  raw  material  (for  example,  energy),  o~ 
labour elasticity, ~ material elasticity, and et state of the technology. 
From  (1)  the  average  variable  cost  function  (ACt)  can  be  derived. 
Prices per unit labour  (rL)  and raw material  (rM) are determined in a 
labour and raw material market respectively. Both are assumed to be 
determined outside the model and are known to the firms. 
The  current  period  quantity  (Yt)  and  price  decision  is,  ceteris 
paribus,  determined  by  the  point  of  intersection  between  the  cost 
curve  and  (expected  individual)  demand  (Dt),  as  is  illustrated  with 
the help of figure I. 
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Figure I.  Price and quantity setting 
In case Dt<Y  2 (see equation la and lb)  a supplier equates Dt and 
Yt  to  offer  a  price  equal  to  the  level of  (minimum)  average  cost, 120  Workable Competition 
because  a  higher  price  indicates  profit  opportunities  for  potential 
entrants  by  offering  a  slightly  lower  price.  A  lower  price  leads  to 
losses.  Hence, 
(2)  Yt =  Dt => 
{Y 
(3)  Pt =  ACt= At  • Yt, 
where, 
(3a)  At =  (~+fl).  [(rL'r~M)/(et'ac"fl%] 1/  , and 
(3b)  a  =  (1-a*--fl)/(c~+fl) with a+fl>l, and  ¢=O with  o~+fl=l. 
In  case  Dt>y2t  (see  equation  lc)  a  firm  is  unable  to  decide  on  a 
price-quantity combination which simultaneously guards  against  los- 
ses  and  deters  entry,  and  for  which equation  (2)  applies.  Therefore, 
part  of individual demand is  unsatisfied by  deciding to  offer Y2t, be- 
cause  then  the  firm  admits  entry  without  suffering  losses.  Entry  is 
provoked,  because  an  entrant  may  absorb  excess  demand.  A  price 
exceeding At leads  to  entrants  offering lower  priced  commodities, so 
the  deciding incumbent  firm  is  confronted  with  unsold  commodities 
and losses. Hence, 
(4)  Yt =  Y~ => 
(5)  Pt =  At. 
The  excess  demand  left  unfulfilled  by  the  incumbent  (Dt-y2t)  is, 
probably, absorbed by an entrant. 
Intertemporal decision making is  devoted to  reducing the proba- 
bility  of entry  and,  therefore,  raising  barriers  to  entry.  It  is  in  this 
context  that  decision making concerning investment in  process inno- 
vations is important. In a barrier market reduced average cost results 
in reduced prices.  Thus,  an incumbent firm strives to  be  the first  to 
introduce  renumerative process  innovations  in  order  to  deter  entry. 
The introduction of an innovation is accompanied by sunk costs. Sunk 
costs result from, for example, search and R&D  activities. To achieve 
a  particular reduction in average cost, it is necessary to invest a  par- 
ticular  amount of sunk costs,  because search  and  R&D  are  not  cost- Workable Competition  121 
less activities.  Sunk costs are included in the decision making process 
by means of amortization charges on average variable cost prices nec- 
essary to precisely recover sunk costs. Hence, after the introduction of 
an  innovation,  the  equilibrium  price  level  is  determined  by  the  re- 
duced level of average variable cost and the amortization charge. 
For reasons of simplicity it is assumed that, although the analysis 
may subsume an  infinite number of short-term periods, the planning 
horizon of the suppliers in their decision process consists of two short- 
term periods. The decision making concerning the amount of innova- 
tive  activity  can  be  attributed  to  the  answers  to  three  questions: 
what constitutes the choice set of innovative activities from which the 
supplier  must  choose,  which  alternative  out  of the  supplier's  choice 
set  is  the  optimal  one,  and  is  the  (optimal)  amount  of  innovative 
activity  renumerative?  The  answers  to  these questions are  examined 
in another order. 
Assume a  firm deciding on whether or not  to initiate an innova- 
tion project at time t. The firm knows or expects the project to 
/i /  be accompanied by sunk costs SCt, 
lead to the introduction of the innovation after 1 period at t+l, 
result in a  reduction of average cost AACt+I from ACt to ACt+l, 
• and 
(4)  raise an innovation barrier to entry of a one-period lifetime• 
Moreover, incumbent firms are frightened that  the potential entrants 
may  initiate  the  same  innovation project.  The firm has  to  calculate 
the  amortization  charge  to  be  able  to  recognize whether  or  not  the 
innovation project is  renumerative. An innovation project is renume-- 
rative if 
(6)  ACt÷I ÷  dt÷l _< Pt, 
where dt+l  denotes the amortization charge  and  Pt  the  current  price 
level•  If  an  incumbent  firm  introduces  a  surcharge  on  its  average 
variable  cost  which  reflects  the  possibility  of earning  above-normal 
profits  in  excess  of the  amount necessary to  recover the  sunk  costs, 
then  this  acts  as  an  incentive to  enter,  because  a  potential  entrant 
may profit by including a  slightly lower surcharge in its price.  There-- 
fore,  the  feasible  amortization  charge  is  calculated  by  means  of ba- 
lancing the net  present  value of costs  and  benefits of the innovation 
project. It is by this means that a  major criterion of workable compe-- 122  Workable Competition 
tition  is  introduced:  "Profits  should  be  at  levels  just  sufficient  to 
reward investment, efficiency and innovation."  (Scherer,  1980, p. 42). 
The  calculation  of the  feasible  amortization  charge  is  illustrated 
in  the  case  that  price  inelastic  demand  grows  with  expected  rate 
and, as stated, a  simple two-period planning horizon holds.  At time t 
a  supplier  decides  on  an  innovation  project  and  assumes  the  sunk 
costs to appear  only in the  current  period and  the benefits  to  appear 
only in the subsequent period. Then, in equilibrium 
(7)  SCt =  [1/(l+r)]  • Yt.,  • dr÷i, with 
(7a)  Yt÷l=  (l+e)  • Dt  if  (l+e)  • Dt<y2÷l,and 
(Tb)  Yt÷l =  Y2t+l  if  (l+e)  •  Dt >  Y2÷I. 
where  r  denotes  the  discount  rate  (being  equal  to  prevailing  and 
known interest rate).  Hence, 
(8)  dt÷1 =  f(SCt)  =  [SCt  •  (l+r)]/(Yt÷i). 
A  supplier  determines  the  optimal  process  innovation,  given  the  ex- 
pected  possibilities,  before  deciding  on  innovative  activity  2.  In  the 
case of perfect foresight the actual innovative possibilities would be a 
public  good.  However,  the  uncertainty  surrounding  the  possibilities 
transforms the public good property into a  private one.  The perceived 
choice set  is assumed as  being represented by  a  function g.  The func- 
tion g  describes  a  relationship  between the  amount  of sunk costs  and 
the  resulting  (expected)  reduction  in  average  cost.  The  introduction 
of  a  larger  reduction  of average  cost  is  simply  assumed  to  be  asso- 
ciated  with  a  larger  amount  of  sunk  costs,  such  that  decreasing  re- 
turns  appear 3,  irrespective  of  the  way  in  which  the  reduction  is 
achieved.  Furthermore,  it  is  postulated  that  firms  are  able  to  intro- 
duce a  process innovation at  the beginning of period t+l  immediately 
to the entire productive capacity. 4 
Equation  (8)  implies  that  dt÷l  is  an  increasing  function  of  SCt 
given  the  supplier's  decision on Yt÷l,  his  knowledge of r  and  his  ex- 
pectations  on  e.  Innovation  projects  are  used  to  reduce  the  future 
prices  as  much as  possible  and  so  decrease  the  likelihood of future  - 
entry.  The future price is  minimized if the marginal  reduction of av- 
erage  cost  is  equal  to  the  marginal  increase  of  the  amortization 
charge,  in  case  of  a  marginal  increase  in  the  amount  of  sunk  costs. 
Hence, equating the derivatives of f  and g leads to an optimal amount 
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The  procedure is  adapted into  formal  modeling by  postulating  a 
priori a relationship between the amount of sunk costs and the reduc- 
tion of average cost, as represented by the function g: 
(9)  AACt+I -- g(SCt)  -- ht  • SCt  #t,  hteR, and 0<#t<l. 
Suppliers'  expectations  and  heterogeneity  are  differentiated  by  the 
parameter  hr.  In combination with equation  (8)  the optimal  amount 




Of/OSCt =  o /OSCt. 
(l+r)/(Yt+l)  :  #t"  ht"  SC/t  Lt-1. 
Rearranging leads to the solution 
(12)  SCt--  {(l÷r)/[#t  • ht"  Yt+l]} [1/(#t-1)] 
Substituting the optimal amount of sunk costs in (8)  and (9)  leads to 
the sustainable amortization charge  and  the expected optimal reduc- 
tion of average cost. 5 
3.  The Simulation of an Innovative Struggle 
A  presentation  has  been  made in  the previous section of a  model of 
the  decision making behaviour of an  individual supplier in  a  barrier 
market  at  a  point  in  time.  In this  section the  interactive  decision - 
making of suppliers over time is  studied to  stress  the fact  that,  in  a 
barrier  market,  static  as  well as  dynamic economies are  generated in 
a  competitive struggle.  The emphasis on a  competitive struggle is  in 
accordance with Schumpeter (1943)  as well as the neo-Austrian theo- 
ry  (e.g.  Kirzner,  1979).  The  traditional  applications  of  dynamic 
analysis  are  based  upon  the  crucial  assumption  that  agents  decide 
simultaneously.~  Non---simultaneous  interactions  between  hetero- 
geneous  agents  are  removed  from  the  scope  of  the  analysis.  Van 
Witteloostuijn  (1986a)  puts  forward  an  argument  in  favour  of  an 
alternative method of dynamic analysis being based  upon non---simul- 
taneous  decision  making  of heterogeneous agents.  In  the  context  of 
the  barrier  market  concept  this  argument  is,  in  a  preliminary  way, 
adapted  into  a  formal  model  by  distinguishing two  large  groups  of 124  Workable Competition 
decision  makers,  the  incumbent  firms  and  potential  entrants,  who 
decide non-simultaneously. 
The  traditional  short-term  period  (Pt,  t=l,...,n)  is  divided  up 
into three ultra short-term periods (Pt,r'  7-=1,2,3).  In the first  ultra 
short-term  period  (Pt,1)  incumbent  firms  decide  simultaneously  on 
supply  price,  supply  quantity  and  the  amount  of sunk  costs,  but  no 
transactions occur. At the end of Pt,1  potential entrants receive infor- 
mation  regarding  incumbent  firms'  decisions  on  price  and  quantity 
which  may  indicate  profit  opportunities  and,  hence,  incentives  to 
enter.  In the second ultra short-term period (Pt,2)  potential entrants 
decide  simultaneously on  the  same  items  as  did  the  incumbents. 
Moreover, the former also decide whether or not to enter during Pt,2" 
Entry  occurs  if  an  entrant's  supply  price  is  lower  than  that  of  an 
incumbent or  when excess  demand is  left  unfulfilled in  Pt,l"  It  is  in 
the  third  ultra  short-term  period  (Pt,3)  where the  transactions  take 
place.  The  whole  procedure  repeats  itself  in  subsequent  Pt's.  Thus, 
the two groups of suppliers -  incumbent firms and potential entrants - 
decide  non-simultaneously  (at  Pt,1  and  Pt,2  respectively).  It  is  by 
this  means  that  the  interactions  between  incumbent  firms  and 
potential entrants come into the picture. 
Several crucial aspects  of the barrier market  are difficult to ana- 
lyze  formally  in  an  integrated  fashion.  Disappointed  and  diverging 
expectations in the context of a  dynamic process are extremely diffi- 
cult  to  analyze  mathematically  (see  Nelson  and  Winter,  1977). 
DEMOS  (Birtwistle,  1979) is  a  promising simulation package to ana- 
lyze  non-simultaneity  and  heterogeneity  in  a  dynamic  context. 
DEMOS  enables  the  analysis  of  competition  as  an  ongoing  process 
containing  heterogeneous  agents  engaged  in  an  interactive  struggle. 
DEMOS  offers  the  possibility  to  model  individual  agents'  behaviour 
separately.  By  adopting  a  sequential-analytical  approach  in  support 
of  non-simultaneous  decision-making  and  heterogeneous  agents  a 
dynamic analysis is  introduced. Moreover, many important phenome- 
na such as actual entry, exit and bankruptcy of agents can be studied 
in a  dynamic context.  A  closer look  at  the  advantages  of simulative 
dynamic analysis with help from DEMOS  is  presented in van Witte-- 
loostuijn (1986b). 
Before interpreting the results  of the  simulation analysis of sup- 
pliers' price and quantity setting and innovative activities in a barrier 
market,  it  is  stressed  that  within-period  uncertainty  is  ignored  for 
the sake of simplicity. The expectations  on  within-period temporary Workable Competition  125 
variables  (prices  and  quantities)  are  confirmed  within  each  short-- 
term  period.  The  prime focus  is  on  the  expectations  of the future - 
period  intertemporal  variables  (process  innovations).  In  this  respect 
this analysis is in line with that of Nelson and Winter (e.g.  1982).  By 
means of assuming a sequence of temporary market equilibria both in 
the  sense of satisfied  ez  ante demand and  within-period certainty,  it 
is  possible  to  concentrate  on  the  intertemporal  coordination  achieve- 
ments  of the  supply  side  in  a  barrier  market.  An important  aspect  of 
the  intertemporal  coordination  is  the  manipulation  of  (the  level of) 
barriers  to  entry  by  means  of  innovative  activities,  which  represent 
an important type of dynamic economy in market behaviour. 
At  the beginning of Pt suppliers  prepare for future developments 
in  production  techniques  by  investing  during  Pt  at  a  reduction  of 
(minimum)  average  variable  cost  which  can  be  introduced  to  the 
entire  productive  capacity  in  Pt+l.  Suppliers  are  uncertain  of  the 
innovative possibilities.  The competitive weapon of suppliers  consists 
of the reduction of minimum average cost by means of investing sunk 
costs.  If  the  individual  supplier  expects  the  future  innovated  price 
(reduced minimum average cost  plus  amortization  charge)  to  exceed 
the  current non-innovated price,  then the innovative activity is  can- 
celed; otherwise, an investment occurs in process innovation. 
Expectations  on  the innovative possibilities  are of crucial impor- 
tance.  Individual  suppliers'  expectations  are  differentiated  by  the 
parameter ht in the function (9): 
(13)  E(AACt,,)  =  E(ht)  • SCt  #t. 
Half of the suppliers  form expectations  according to Keynes' conven- 
tion  and  say  that  "our  usual  practice  [is] to  take the existing situa- 
tion and to project it into the future"  (Keynes, 1936, p.  148).  Hence, 
(14)  E(ht)  =  hr. 1 . 
The other half of the suppliers  employ a  simple autoregressive model 
of expectations formation: 
(15)  E(ht)  =  1/2  • ht_ 1 +  1/2  • ht_  2 . 
The importance of the equations  (14)  and (15)  is  that  they introduce 
diverging expectations. Of course, other models of expectations forma- 
tion can be introduced as  well as long as  they allow for diverging ex- 
pectations.  A  competitive  struggle  is  a  sequel  to  heterogeneity  (see 126  Workable Competition 
van Witteloostui]n,  1988c).  Diverging expectations reflect  an upmost 
important aspect of heterogeneity. In order to illustrate the competi- 
tive struggle a simulation is run. 
The parameter #t is set  on 0.5  and Yt=5.  The actual  value of h t 
is determined by a  draw from a  normal distribution with mean 3 and 
standard  deviation  0.3.  At  the  beginning  of  Pt  the  value  of  ht  is 
drawn.  At the same time, individual suppliers calculate the expected 
values  of  hr.  On  the  basis  of  the  expected  ht  individual  suppliers 
decide on the amount of sunk costs to invest in Pt (equation  12).  On 
its  turn  AACt,I  together  with  the  individual  demand,  the  current 
level of average  cost  and discount rate  determine the future level  of 
average  cost  and  amortization  charge,  and  thereby  the future inno- 
vated price (equations 9 and 8).  In order to concentrate on the impli- 
cations of uncertainty and sunk costs to market behaviour in the con- 
text  of  an  innovative  struggle,  the  demand  side  is  simplified  even 
further by  assuming aggregate demand to  be in a  price inelastic sta- 
tionary  state  (e=O).  The  market  consists  of  five  incumbent  firms, 
each  being  confronted  by  a  constant  level  of  individual  demand, 
which will permit production at a constant rate of return. 
It  is  important  to  note  that,  firstly,  potential  entrants  are  also 
assumed to  innovate and that,  secondly, retired  incumbent firms are 
allowed to  re-enter  one period following their  exit.  It  is  in  this  re- 
spect that  one may think of cross  entry and exit from one branch of 
industry (e.g.  pick up players)  to  another that  is  closely related (e.g. 
compact disc players).  Seven entrants  are modeled in addition to the 
five incumbents. Suppliers 3,  4,  6,  7,  10  and 12 employ Keynes'  con- 
vention  and  the  remainder  employ  the  autoregressive  expectation 
mechanism.  The  simulation  experiment  is  run  with  the  additional 
variables  of the discount rate and minimum average cost in Pt being 
0.03  and  100  respectively.  In  order  to  generate  the  initial  situation 
the suppliers are kept well-informed of ht in P1  and P2.  Following an 
8-period run the following results occur: Workable Competition 




Optimal  Actual  price  Actual  price  Actual  price 
price  surviving  retired  entrants 
incumbents  incumbents 
100  100 
93.46  93.46 
88.76  88.76 
76.93  82.14 
64.61  73.18 
52.40  60.17 
42.64  49.58 
31.79  38.91 
83.49  82.14 
74.63  73.18 
After  P~  suppliers  no  longer  receive  advance  information  regarding 
the actual development of the innovative possibilities. Therefore, they 
are  unable  to  keep  pace  with  the  time path  of the  lowest  prices.  In 
period  4  and  5  higher  priced  incumbent  firms  are  expelled from the 
market  by lower priced entrants.  To sketch  a  detailed picture of the 
underlying  competitive  processes,  a  closer  look  is  takeh  at  the  life-- 
history  of suppliers  2  and  3.  The  development  of values  of relevant 
parameters  and  variables  as  would  be generated  by  a  well-informed 
"perfect foresight" supplier has been employed as a point of reference. 
A  "perfect foresight"  supplier would decide on its  innovative activity 
on the basis  of the actual development of parameter ht,  which deter- 
mines innovative possibilities: 




Actual  in-  Optimal  Optimal  Optimal  Optimal  Optimal 
novative  sunk  average  minimum  amortl-  price 
parameter  costs  cost  average  zation  at t 
at t-1  at t-1  reduction  cost  at  charge 
at t  t  at t 
4  3.39  21.73  15.80  72.46  4.48  76.93 
5  3.07  10.77  10.07  62.39  2.22  64.61 
6  3.28  16.89  13.47  48.92  3.48  52.40 
7  2.88  7.31  7.79  41.13  1.51  42.64 
8  3.22  14.86  12.40  28.73  3.06  31.79 128  Workable Competition 
Supplier 2  and  3 base their decision upon autoregressive expectations 
and Keynes' convention respectively, leading, in the turbulent  periods 
4 and 5, to the following results: 
Table HI.  Life-history supplier 2 and 3 
Expected innovati- 
ve parameter at t-I 
Actual  sunk 
costs  at t-1 
Expected average 
cost  reduction  at t 
Expected minimum 
average cost at t 
Actual  amortiza- 
tion charge at t 
Expected price 
at t 
Short-term  Short-term 
period  4  period  5 
Supplier 2  Supplier 3  Suppller 2  Supplier 3 
2.61  2.31  2.85  3.39 
4.27  2.41  6.88  21.73 
5.40  3.59  7.48  15.80 
82.86  84.67  73.78  67.19 
0.88  O. 50  1.42  4.48 
83.74  85.17  75.20  71.67 
In  P3  supplier  2  as  well  as  supplier  3  underestimated  the  actual 
innovative  possibilities,  as  reflected  in  E(h3).  However,  supplier  2's 
expectation  diverges  from  reality  to  a  greater  extent  than  that  of 
supplier  3.  Based  upon  their  estimates,  both  suppliers  decided  on 
their innovative activity in P3, leading to the following results in P4: Workable Competition 





Average cost reduction 
Minimum average  cost 
Amortizatlon charge 
Price offered 
Supplier 2  Supplier 3 
7.00  5.62 
81.62  83.00 
0.88  0.50 
82.14  83.49 
In P4  both  supplier  2 and supplier 3 are surprised by a  larger reduc- 
tion  in  average  cost  than  expected.  However,  supplier  2  attains  a 
larger  reduction  because of its  larger  investing  efforts.  Supplier  3  is 
unable to  compensate its  innovative inferiority by  means  of a  lower 
amortization charge. Therefore, in P4,i supplier 2 succeeds in offering 
a price lower than the price level of supplier 3.  Hence, in P4 suppliers 
employing  autoregressive  expectations  show  a  superior  performance 
relative  to  those  suppliers  who  are  behaving  in  accordance  with 
Keynes' convention. Therefore, the former stay in the market (among 
these  is  supplier  2),  and  the  latter  (among  these  is  supplier  3)  are 
pushed  aside  by  lower priced  entrants.  At  the  end  of P4,1 potential 
entrants receive information about incumbent firms' price and quanti- 
ty  setting  and,  probably,  recognize profit  opportunities.  In  P4,2 in- 
cumbents 3 and 4 are outbid by entrants 8 and 9. In P4,3 transactions 
take  place  and  ex  ante  demand  is  satisfied.  With  respect  to  entry 
movements,  the  "first  come  first  served"  rule  holds,  because  the 
demand side shows no preference for either equal priced entrant. 
In the short-term period V the opposite results occur. Supplier 2 
underestimated  and  supplier  3  overestimated  the  actual  innovative 
possibilities.  Therefore,  in  P4  supplier  2  invested  insufficiently  in 
innovative  activity  and  supplier  3  overstated  its  investment.  Based 
upon the under respectively overshooting of the amount of sunk costs 
the following results occur in Ps: 130  Workable Competition 




Average cost reduction 
Minimum average  cost 
Amortization charge 
Price offered 
Supplier 2  Supplier 3 
8.04  14.30 
73.21  68.70 
1.42  4.48 
74.63  73.18 
Supplier  2  is  surprised  by  a  larger  reduction  in  average  cost  than 
expected.  The  opposite  holds  for  supplier  3.  Nevertheless,  in  P5,2 
supplier  3  is  able  to  undercut  supplier  2's  price,  because the  latter's 
lower  amortization  charge  does  not  outweigh  the  former's  larger 
reduction in average cost.  Hence, in P5 contrary to P4,  "Keynes' con- 
vention"  suppliers'  performance  is  superior  relative  to  that  of  the 
"autoregressive  expectation"  suppliers.  At  the  end  of  P5,1 potential 
entrants  receive information  on  incumbent  firms'  prices  and  quanti- 
ties  and,  probably,  notice  profit  opportunities.  Therefore,  in  P5,2 
supplier  3  re-enters  the  market  by  outbidding  an  incumbent  who 
employs  autoregressive  expectations.  "Autoregressive  expectation" 
incumbents  are  expelled  from  the  market  by  the  lower  priced  en- 
trants.  In  P5,2 incumbents  1,  2,  5,  8  and  9  are  pushed  aside  by 
entrants  3,  4  (both  re---entering),  6,  7  and  12.  In  P5,3 transactions 
occur  and  ez  ante  demand  is  satisfied.  In  the  short-term  periods 
thereafter the  "Keynes' convention" suppliers  are able to survive the 
competitive  struggle  to  the  expense  of  "autoregressive  expectation" 
suppliers.  Thus,  the  suppliers  including  additional  information  in 
their  forecasting  procedure,  show  a  performance  inferior  to  those 
employing limited information! 
The simulation experiment reflects a further step in the direction 
towards  analyzing  heterogeneous  agents  engaged  in  a  competitive 
struggle.  The introduction of process innovations is endogenized. The 
barrier market combines, given suppliers'  expectations, careful pricing 
at  a  point  in  time  with  the  introduction  of  innovations  over  time. 
Therefore, static  and dynamic economies of market behaviour are in- 
tegrated. Workable Competition  131 
4.  Fiual Remarks 
This  paper  has  been  devoted to  two  important  subjects:  firstly,  the 
barrier market concept has been formally elaborated  in a  very simple 
context and, secondly, an  alternative method of dynamic analysis has 
been  employed. The barrier  market  is  meant  to  be  a  theory of sup- 
pliers'  market  behaviour  in  which  the  forces  behind  static  and 
dynamic  economies  are  integrated.  Suppliers'  decision  making  and 
their  behaviour is  directed  by  a  dominant threat  of entry.  Contrary 
to  the  contestable  market  the  barrier  market  includes  barriers  to 
entry,  and  contrary  to  the  theory  of  barriers  to  entry  the  barrier 
market  excludes  the earning of above-normal profits.  In this  way,  a 
formal elaboration of the concept of workable competition is offered. 
A  method of dynamic analysis has been employed so enabling the 
study  of market  behaviour  as  an  ongoing competitive process.  Non- 
simultaneity of incumbents' and  entrants'  decision making and hete- 
rogeneity in  the  form of diverging expectations  are  the  essentials  of 
the competitive process. The dynamic analysis introduces the implica- 
tions  of an  innovative struggle in  the form of entry  and  exit  move- 
ments, a changing state of the technology and decreasing prices. 132  Workable Competition 
Notes: 
*  University  of  Limburg,  Faculty  of  Economics  and  Business  Administration, 
P.O.  Box 616,  6200  MD  Maastricht,  the Netherlands. 
This paper is  a  revised version of Maks  and  van  Witteloostuijn (1987).  We 
would  like  to  thank  M.J.  Holler  and  an  anonymous  referree  for  their  valuable 
comments.  Of course, they do not bear any responsibility for remaining errors. 
1 A  fiat  bottomed  U---shape of cost  curves  is  not  in  conflict  with  the  results  of 
empirical research (e.g.  Scherer,  1980,  p.  89.  Shepherd,  1979,  p.  245  and  Koutso- 
yiannis,  1983,  p.  137). 
2  Of  course,  the  modeling  of  perceptions  can  be  easily  bypassed  by  assuming 
perfect foresight in  this respect, for example by means of a  Kennedy--like (1966) 
innovation  possibility curve.  However,  if everybody  knows  everything,  then  the 
analysis of a  process becomes superfluous,  as,  in  a  way,  shown  by  Dasgupta and 
Stiglitz  (1980a,  1980b)  and  Kamien  and  Schwartz  (1982).  In  the  case  of perfect 
foresight  the  extent  of  innovative  activity  is  postulated  rather  than  explained 
(see, for  instance,  Binswanger,  1978). 
3  To  assume  decreasing returns  in  this  respect is in  accordance  with  the  results 
of  empirical  and  theoretical  research  (see  Kamien  and  Schwartz,  1982.  pp. 
64--70  and  192). 
4 As is usually done in  models of endogenous innovations (e.g.  Binswanger,  1978 
and Iwai,  1984). 
5 Van  Witteloostuijn and  Maks  (1987)  and  van  Witteloostuijn  (1988a)  offer  an 
elaborated  analysis  of  a  barrier  market  model.  In  particular,  the  link  between 
the  state  of  the  technology  e  and  investment  behaviour  SC  is  elaborated. 
Moreover,  in  van  Witteloostuijn  (1988a)  and  (1988b)  the  existence  of  Nash 
equilibria within  each  period  (with  respect  to  price  and  quantity  setting)  and 
over periods (with  respect to investment in  process innovations) is proven. 
6  This  method  of  discrete  dynamic  analysis  is  in  particular  employed  within 
general equilibrium theory, being based upon  the  assumption of temporary equi- 
libria (e.g.  Hicks,  1939,  Arrow and  Hahn,  1971  and  Grandmont,  1983). Workable Competition  133 
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ABSTRACT: To  decide on  interventions in  a  market economy poli- 
ticians have to consider the temporary and intertemporal coordination 
achievements of market behaviour, as  reflected in static and dynamic 
economies  respectively.  In  this  respect  the  barrier  market  concept 
might  serve  for  guidance.  The  barrier  market  amounts  to  a  formal 
elaboration of the workable competition concept.  In this  paper  a  mo- 
del  is  presented  of  decision  making  of  an  individual  supplier  in  a 
barrier  market.  Moreover, results  are offered of analyses of competi- 
tive processes in which heterogeneous suppliers interact over time. 